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Abstract 
In the preliminary introduction, we point to Schopenhauer’s ethics and philosophy of religion and to his 
peculiar understanding of the notion of freedom as grace. On the basis of this constellation, we then start 
with three Meadian analyses. We first introduce the topics of space and touch in the discussion of 
Mead’s philosophy of intersubjectivity and the related problem of an ethical temporality. We try to 
demonstrate the importance of the so called “interval” in ethics, understood in a temporal as well as 
spatial sense. For this purpose, we offer three Meadian meditations by reading (in both a philosophical 
and a religious way) Ludwig Feuerbach’s, Jean-Louis Chrétien’s, and Watsuji Tetsurō’s texts and by 
relating them to Mead’s original inception of the philosophy of intersubjectivity. Finally, by reading 
Benjamin Libet’s Mind Time in an ethical register, we argue for a “theological” extension of Mead’s 
philosophy also by indicating the nature of the ethical “interval” and the related phenomenon of ethical 
temporality as grace. 
 
 
 
 
“Yet, as Aristotle shows, the interval is never abolished, 
only forgotten. There always remains an intervening body 
between our flesh and what it touches, a three-dimensional 
layer of air or water” (Chrétien 2004, pp. 87f.). 
 
“This interval – and this medium – is first of all nature, as 
it remains left to itself: air, water, earth, and sun, as fire and 
light. Being par excellence – matter of the transcendental” 
(Irigaray 2008, p. 19). 
 
“Libet’s work has focused on temporal relations between 
neural events and conscience. He is famous in part for 
discovering that we unconsciously decide to act well before 
we think we’ve made the decision to act” (S.M. Kosslyn, 
Foreword, in Libet 2004, p. x). 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In my previous analyses of ethical gestures I have tried to reflect upon, in my opinion, 
one of the most important problems in ethics, namely, the constitution of an ethical 
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interiority. On this issue, I have first written two papers on Schopenhauer, discussing the 
role of body in his metaphysical conception of ethics. I have also brought 
Schopenhauer’s thought closer to American pragmatism, to James’ radical empiricism 
specifically. Why Schopenhauer? Allow me to briefly outline my interpretation. In his On 
the Basis of Morality, Schopenhauer writes the following:  
 
“With these allusions to the metaphysics of ethics I must rest content, although an important step 
remains to be taken. But this presupposes that a further step be taken in ethics itself, which I could not 
do, because the highest aim of ethics is limited to jurisprudence and moral philosophy in Europe, and 
here no one knows, or indeed will admit, what is beyond these” (Schopenhauer 1998, p. 214). 
 
Usually we think that for Schopenhauer, the ethics of compassion and sympathy (and 
thus, a kind of pre-critical intersubjective ethics) can only be affirmed metaphysically by 
acknowledging the Will in the world and its total denial in ourselves through the ascetic 
practice (i.e. the quietening of the will, which means surpassing the ego(t)istic will in 
ourselves). As a result, I realize that the others are actually the same as me and thus feel 
compassion with their suffering. But in this metaphysical model (designed in a clear anti-
Kantian manner) there is a lacuna: namely, the body felt in its immediacy is for 
Schopenhauer the first object in the epistemological constitution of the self as will. My 
body is to me, paradoxically, the first external object. This is clearly traceable in the 
fourth book of The World as Will and Representation, where we are faced with the following 
ethical paradox: in the moment before we feel that the other has been wronged or before 
we act compassionately towards the other (i.e. “see” or “recognize” their pain) we always 
already feel the “secret presentiment” (geheime Ahndung) inside (our body) – as a “sting of 
conscience” (Gewissensbiß). When I realize that the others are the same as me, I already 
share in their pain. This suffering is “wholly direct and even instinctive (instinktartig).” 
(Schopenhauer 1969, p. 163) And ultimately, this is to Schopenhauer the exact essence 
of freedom, which is again understood as grace.  
Now, some recent developments in scholarship devoted to G.H. Mead’s philosophy 
have raised his thought to an equal standing in relation to other key philosophers, not 
only in American pragmatism but also in the context of Western philosophical tradition. 
Besides the undisputed role that Mead’s thought has played in social sciences, it is clear 
that his philosophy has much to offer with regard to some key contemporary 
epistemological and ethical problems. Erkki Kilpinen, for example, has recently 
convincingly argued that Mead would need to be recognized as the forerunner of Lakoff 
and Johnson’s philosophical project (Philosophy in the Flesh, 1999), calling Mead an 
empirically responsible philosopher. With his and other similar attempts, Mead’s philosophy 
has become a part of the epistemological tradition dealing with the embodied mind. 
Others still have read Mead in an intercultural key or discussed some interesting 
comparative possibilities concerning the attunement of the body or the mind-body 
problem (e.g. Steve Odin in his paper on Mead in “Philosophy of East and West”, 42 
(3/1992), or philosophers using Shigenori Nagatomo’s thought for their philosophies). 
But Mead’s most important contribution to philosophy is undoubtedly his theory of 
intersubjectivity. In my presentation, I wish to offer three epistemological meditations 
on these Meadian themes.  
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In one of my previous analyses of Mead (Škof 2015), I offered an interpretation of 
ethical temporality in Mead. I elaborated on the temporality of gesture and tried to 
approach the problem of intersubjectivity by relating Mead’s philosophy to Kierkegaard 
and Derrida’s concepts of subjectivity, interiority, and time. I argued that only by 
reflecting upon the inner logic of ethical temporality we can balance the inner structure 
of his thought, which can be done precisely by securing the ethical interval between 
interiority as a philosophical core of Mead’s philosophy and the role that exteriority and the 
social self played in various psychological or sociological interpretations of his thought. 
In the present attempt, I would like to further develop this argument by introducing into 
the discussion about Mead’s philosophy of intersubjectivity the topics of space and touch. 
For this purpose I will offer three Meadian meditations by reading Ludwig Feuerbach, 
Jean-Louis Chrétien and Watsuji Tetsurō’s texts and by relating them to Mead’s original 
inception of the philosophy of intersubjectivity. I will try to demonstrate the importance 
of an interval in ethics, both in the temporal and spatial senses. In that, I will also refer 
to Benjamin Libet’s book Mind Time, a fascinating account on the epistemological gap or 
interval, which deserves our attention. Finally, I will argue for a “theological” extension 
in Mead’s original constellation by indicating the analogy or nature of the interval as 
love, compassion, or grace. 
Much like Mead’s role used to be underemphasised by the tradition of philosophy, 
Ludwig Feuerbach, too, was long considered a transitional philosopher to whom many 
authors ascribed significance for the later development of certain philosophical topics, 
such as criticism of religion, materialism, sensibility, etc., but to whom the Western 
tradition, nevertheless, did not wish to award a place of honour among other 
philosophical giants of the West. However, with the epistemological pre-eminence of 
skin and touch and his original philosophy of sensibility, Feuerbach paved the way 
towards the first Western theory of intersubjectivity. In the present analysis I will 
delineate the epistemological space of sensitivity in Feuerbach and compare it to Mead’s 
genesis of an intersubjective self – in terms of gestures and as based on the primacy of 
“contact experience” in Mead. In his “phenomenology” of gesture, Mead ascribes great 
importance to the hand, which also opens interesting possibilities of interpreting him as 
a “haptic philosopher” (a remark made by his student David L. Miller; note also an 
elaboration of “hand” in Heidegger – as a gesture, carrying out the bodily-felt 
dimensions of meaning, as David Kleinberg-Levin asserts).  
On the other side, there is Jean-Louis Chrétien, who in his Call and Response (1992) 
deals precisely with the bodily scheme as proposed by some interpreters of Mead. 
Chrétien’s epistemological credo (“I never start by saying ‘I’, I start by being ‘thou-ed’ by 
the world”), together with his rehabilitation of touch (and space) is what I find to be a 
most interesting possibility today for extending both Feuerbachian and Meadian 
concepts of self to the contemporary philosophy of intersubjectivity. But Chrétien, in 
the ethical line of his argument, also mentions a related “nothingness” of self as a 
possibility for negating the old Biblical saying “I am, and there is no one besides me” 
(Isaiah 47:10). While here, both in his concept of touch as well as nothingness of the self, 
interesting intercultural possibilities open, it is through Watsuji Tetsurō’s thought that I 
intend to eventually show the importance of the concept of aidagara (“relatedness”, 
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“betweenness”) and climate, interpreted both as space and touch/contact, for the 
understanding of Mead’s philosophy.  
 
 
2. Coming to the Stage of Ethics 
 
Let me begin my reflection with a highly interesting citation from Kakyō, Zeami’s most 
important work on Japanese aesthetics. Zeami Motokiyo (1363–1443) was a Japanese 
aesthetician, actor and playwright, influenced by Zen. Kakyō is his important work on the 
essence of Noh theatre. Symbolically, a reflection on theatre can, in my opinion, 
represent the essence of our intersubjective relations. The citation reads as follows: 
 
“When [the actor] enters stage in a sarugaku [performance] and begins the [opening] speech or issei 
[passage], there will be a peak for that moment. [Too] early is wrong. [Too] late will also be wrong. 
To being with, [the actor] leaves the greenroom, walks onto the hashigakari, [the bridge connecting 
the backstage to the main stage,] and stops; he [then] takes in all directions, and he should speak just 
when the audience holds with anticipation the thought, ‘ There, he’s going to speak!’ This is ‘the 
opportune moment [that] corresponds to the feeling [of the audience]’, whereat [the actor] speaks after 
having caught the spirit of the audience. If this opportune moment is even a little bit late, the spirit of 
the audience will once again relax, and when he begins to recite after that, it will not correspond to 
everyone’s feeling. This opportune moment is, simply, [a reflection of] the [receptive] ch’i of the 
spectators. What is called ‘the opportune moment that is the ch’i of the spectators’ is a peak that the 
actor perceives by his intuition. This is the critical moment when [the actor] draws everyone’s rapt 
attention just to this state of concentration. It is one of the [most] important moments of a given day[’s 
performance]” (Zeami 1982, pp. 461f.). 
 
This paragraph of Zeami is extraordinary: it brings to the fore the most important 
elements of the intersubjective and gestural conversation I wish to analyse in this 
presentation: the threshold between the Noh actor and audience (me and other(s) in 
Meadian terms), indicating the conversational (breath-)space (aidagara in Watsuji, air and 
water in Aristotle’s On the Soul, 423a 221 and, as we will see, in Chrétien) between them, 
and, importantly – in tune with Zen philosophy –, the role of breath in this process. For a 
Noh actor it is decisive to appear on stage precisely at the moment when his audience 
would expect him to appear – and raise his voice. He has to come to the stage and raise 
his voice accordingly to the “spirit of the audience” (German Gemeingefühl ). This points 
at temporal as well as spatial problems of all intersubjective relations: if he is too late, 
                                                 
1 “Let us assume that every body has depth, i.e. has three dimensions, and that if two bodies have a 
third body between them they cannot be in contact with one another; let us remember that what is 
liquid is not independent of body and must be or contain water, and that if two bodies touch one 
another under water, their touching surfaces cannot be dry, but must have water between, viz. the 
water which wets their bounding surfaces; from all this it follows that in water two bodies cannot be in 
contact with one another. The same holds of two bodies in air – air being to bodies in air precisely 
what water is to bodies in water – but the facts are not so evident to our observation, because we live in 
air, just as animals that live in water would not notice that the things which touch one another in water 
have wet surfaces. The problem, then, is: does the perception of all objects of sense take place in the 
same way, or does it not; e.g. taste and touch requiring contact (as they are commonly thought to do), 
while all other senses perceive over a distance?” (Aristotle, On the Soul, 423a 22-423b 4;  Engl. transl.: 
Aristotle 1984, p. 673). 
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only for a moment, the common atmosphere/collective mood is lost. If he is there too 
early, again, the link with the audience is interrupted or broken. The actor must be a 
master of this threshold: he must know/sense intuitively, in his interiority and from the 
breaths and hearts of the audience, the exact time-space of his vocal appearance – a vocal 
gesture that, of course, is always an intersubjective or social act already.  
Now, this short paragraph of Zeami shows the essence of what I understand as a 
fundamental layer of all intersubjective relations and especially ethics: the threshold (in 
theological-ethical terms, it will later be related to grace) as our time-space-between, as 
based on bodily signs in the course of our contact experience. We know that in Mead’s 
philosophy from Mind, Self and Society, our body is itself a bridge to the other. We are also 
“reading the meaning of the conduct of other people, when, perhaps, they are not aware 
of it […] just the glance of an eye, the attitude of the body […]” (Mead 1967, p. 14)2. But 
the bridge is always already a threshold that we need to address, both by intuition and 
cognition. Mead himself points to the first (pre-cognitive) layer in his 1914 Lectures in 
Social Psychology, in the chapter Imitation and Imagination, when he states that we can discern 
various bodily signs in ourselves/our self, which can help us first establish the threshold 
or difference between the ego and the alteri, and then also bridge the gap to the other – 
such as an “organic sensation, cyclopean eye, feeling in the throat that accompanies 
articulation, kinaesthetic and visceral ideas […]” (Miller 1982, p. 65). All these elements 
are in the closest proximity to similar empirico-organic or process philosophies and 
theologies of our age. But their first predecessor was Feuerbach. Let us now first take a 
closer look into his philosophy. 
 
 
3. Constitution of the Other in Feuerbach, Chrétien and Watsuji, 
as related to Mead’s Conversation of Gestures 
 
Now, through some recent scholarship on Mead it has become clear that his philosophy 
is complementary to the field of embodied cognition or embodied mind. Moreover, in 
the Introduction to his already mentioned 1914 and 1927 class lectures, D.L. Miller calls 
Mead both a process philosopher and, even more importantly, a haptic philosopher3. In 
relation to the concept of the so-called “contact experience” in Mead, this is of great 
importance for my analysis. Namely, in this line of reasoning, we can easily think Mead’s 
original constitution of the conversation of gestures in the language of the philosophy of 
skin (Feuerbach), touch (Chrétien) and the betweenness of persons (Watsuji; also a 
climate or fūdo). But even more importantly, all these reflections inaugurate a completely 
different layer in the relation between the “I” and the “me”, between my self and the 
selves of the others, which now constitutes my social self. As K.J. Booth (2013, p. 137) 
argues, in this process “there must be a basic level of consciousness that is 
developmentally prior to taking the attitude of the other and that develops into self-
consciousness” (here it would be interesting to point to B. Libet’s experiments, but I will 
                                                 
2 See also n. 9. On this aspect see W. Bergmann and G. Hoffmann’s (1985) chapter G.H. Mead und die 
Tradition der Phänomenologie, p. 110. 
3 I am indebted to Roman Madzia for kindly reminding me of this remark (on “haptic” see Miller’s 
Introduction (1982, pp. 12 and 22)). 
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elaborate on them later). He refers to Shigenori Nagatomi’s well-known distinction 
between the subject-body and the object-body, where the former is the body in the 
sense of epistemic centre of our consciousness. We can acknowledge this as a basic 
postulate for securing the place of interiority in our social selves. But what kind of logic 
constitutes this interiority? At this point, one step further has to be taken. We know that 
for Mead both attitude and gesture are fully embodied. But how does Mead, being a 
haptic philosopher, understand our intersubjective relations between embodied 
individuals or bodies that touch one another? I wish now to take a detour through three 
other philosophers and present three meditations on a Meadian theme only to be able to 
return to Mead and try to offer some answers to this question. 
 
a) Ludwig Feuerbach 
I have mentioned Schopenhauer at the beginning of this paper. His role in the history of 
philosophy has often been regarded as transitional, and the same can be said of Ludwig 
Feuerbach. But there is a more important similarity between the two that also 
distinguishes them from other mainstream idealistic philosophers of the 18th and 19th 
centuries (Berkeley and Hume, Fichte, Kant and Hegel, but not Schelling). The role of 
the body in the constitution of the world of representation in Schopenhauer has been 
explained earlier. 
According to Hans Joas (1985, p. 2), Mead is “the most important theorist of 
intersubjectivity between Feuerbach and Habermas.” But is there an even more 
substantive link between Feuerbach and Mead? Feuerbach’s theory of intersubjectivity is 
not defined in “Meadian” terms, of course. But there are two important facts I wish to 
discuss: the very constitution of the other, on the one side, and the role of the 
body/skin, on the other. Analogous to Mead’s constitution of the intersubjective/social 
self via “I” and “me”, is Feuerbach’s statement, at the end of Principles of Philosophy of 
Future, that the true dialectic is posited not as a monologue of a solitary thinker to 
himself, but as a continuous dialogue between “I” and “Thou”. Moreover, Feuerbach 
bases his philosophy of sensibility on the elements of Nature. To these he adjoins the 
human being as another element of Nature, along with organs or body parts (eyes, head, 
heart, stomach, sexual organs) among which, in the preeminent position as the 
fundamental organ of perception, appears none other than the skin. Feuerbach as a 
haptic philosopher? Perhaps – for the philosophy of sensibility (or rather sensitivity) 
begins in the body, especially in the skin/touch. In an exceptional passage from his 1841 
work entitled Some Comments on the “Beginning of Philosophy” of Dr J.F. Reiff, Feuerbach 
states the following: 
 
“Through the body, the Self is not the Self, but rather an object. Being-in-the-body means being-in-
the-world. So many senses – so many pores. The self is nothing other than the porous self.”4 
 
The porous nature of our self now indicates something extremely important: our self 
(which is basically understood as the sentient being) is only constituted objectively or 
socially through its fundamental intersubjective act: just like we depend epistemologically 
                                                 
4 For citations and elaboration on this see my Breath of Proximity (Škof 2015, p. 78). 
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on Nature (the role of elements and sensitivity), we depend ethically-socially on others. 
Feuerbach adds something else to this constellation: it is precisely and only through our 
intersubjective and social acts that we experience something infinitely bigger than we 
and our finite selves are: which is love (or grace)5. This excess of love in Feuerbach is 
precisely the missing link of all previous ethics: the interval of love/grace – as already 
shown by Schopenhauer and now posited by Feuerbach for the first time in the history 
of philosophy – as an intersubjective act. Löwith reminds us that even before I am 
aware, “I have already left Nature, the unconscious, founded on the Dasein of the Other” 
(Löwith 1976, p. 49). 
To wind up this short reflection: in my book on intersubjectivity I have shown that 
there exists a profound proximity between Feuerbach and process philosophy or 
theology. Carol Christ, a process-oriented thinker, reflects upon our 
intersubjective/social relations as follows:  
 
“In the process view, the world is a web of changing individuals interacting with and affecting each other, co-
creating the world. Relationships are the building blocks of life. In them we grow and develop. In them we experience 
the joy of living. In them we are traumatized and suffer. Without them, we would not be. Personal 
relationships are embedded in a web of structural relationships that shape societies and cultures. The 
world is social through and through. When others are suffering, we suffer. When others are happy, we feel 
their joy. […] If the air we breathe is clean, we may breathe more deeply. If it is poisoned, we may 
grasp for breath, cough, and eventually become ill” (Christ 2003, pp. 69ff.; my emphases). 
 
We are now close to what I later refer to as the so-called riddle in the ethics of 
sympathy, based on our observations. But I have to take another step – towards the 
reflection on touch in the philosophy of Jean-Louis Chrétien. 
 
b) Jean-Louis Chrétien 
If we insist on the significance of contact experience in Mead, and put Feuerbach’s 
theory of sensibility (skin, sense organs, and nature) qua intersubjectivity into an epoché 
for a moment, then Chrétien’s philosophy of contact/touch as a key novelty in recent 
phenomenology (and philosophy in general) is of great importance for any constitution 
of intersubjective relations. Firstly, for Chrétien, we only live to respond – to the other, 
to our closest environment, and to God. In this, for him, the body is the highest 
representation of the spirit. But the most important of all experiences is the 
tactile/haptic experience, or touch. In this constellation, the call, our voice, our 
conscious response and act, always comes too late, or in Chrétien’s words: 
 
“Does the call, upon which we have meditated at such length in our preceding chapters, not indeed 
always come too late, if it finds us already constituted without it, before it, in the silence of a sensing 
that is originally turned toward the self, even when the self is affected by another?” (Chrétien 2004, p. 
84). 
                                                 
5 For this reason, Joas is probably not perfectly accurate in his statement that Feuerbach in his thought 
is only encountering the other in a contemplative way (Joas 1985, p. 13). I think that the constitution of 
intersubjectivity in Feuerbach already opens a path towards practical ethics, which, of course, is 
cosmologically underpinned. But Joas is certainly right in pointing at the corporeality of subjects, being 
in their everyday practical intersubjective relations (ibidem, p. 14). 
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The priority of our self-constitution is based on the self-receptivity of touch. Translated into 
Meadian terms, our desire to emit any kind of vocal gesture is already constituted prior 
to any reflexivity, in a milieu of touch. In Chrétien, touch exceeds tact, since it is not 
limited to a mere contact. In the paragraph by Aristotle, we have seen that no animal is 
deprived of touch and that “the sense of touch is inseparable from life itself” (ibidem, p. 
85). Through touch we enter into relationships with others, since the experience of 
touch is a basic experience of contact (or, its precondition and milieu) that we all have in 
our life affairs. But it is important to acknowledge, as also Aristotle would already know, 
that the interval between us and others is never abolished, that our touch, paradoxically, 
never touches and thus, as it were, safeguards the difference and autonomy of the other 
person. The touch is of course present in a manner by which we generally address (same 
as in Feuerbach) our sensitivity. But there is another paradoxical element in the touch: as 
a sense organ (i.e. skin) it is oriented towards the outer world, for, as an organ, it 
“cannot be nor become an object to itself” (Chrétien 2004, p. 120)6. Here the 
intersubjective process begins (structurally, this is analogous to both Feuerbach and 
Mead):  
 
“I feel myself only by favor of the other. It is the other who gives me to myself insofar as the return 
to myself and to my own actions or affections always supposes this other. The most intimate sensation, 
the sensation of my own sensitive life in act, is also the most open, and its intimacy is deployed only 
through its openness. To feel oneself is not a beginning, but a response to the appeal made by a 
sensible that is other than myself and that elicits the exercise of my acts. I never start by saying ‘I’, I 
start by being ‘thou-ed’ by the world” (Chrétien 2004, p. 120). 
 
This statement, written in the phenomenological language, is very close to Mead’s 
constitution of gesture as a social act. But perhaps it is only in its excess that the logic of 
touch can really be understood. In his final words in the chapter Body and Touch, Chrétien 
goes as far as to refer to the touch of God: Saint John of the Cross, namely, speaks of 
“God’s touch” and interprets it as the “‘merciful hand of the Father’ with which he 
touches the Son.” (ibidem, p. 130) This is a caress, an ethical gesture of sympathy and 
compassion. And it is Aquinas who understands this touching as grace, an excess we 
cannot understand or – properly speaking – condition. Isn’t Mead’s elaboration of 
sympathetic gesture in the closest proximity to this mystical constellation? He states:  
 
“The other is a different person and, being different, his suffering is different from mine, but he is a 
suffering being to whom I react immediately” (Mead 1967, p. 62). 
 
It is now time to address our third example, Watsuji Tetsurō’s philosophy of aidagara. 
 
c) Watsuji Tetsurō 
In his excellent study of Mead and Watsuji Tetsurō’s (1889-1960) philosophy and 
communitarian ethics, Steve Odin (1992) points to a deep structural proximity between 
                                                 
6 Earlier in his phenomenological constitution of the touch, Chrétien mentions W. Wundt and his 
elaboration of touch as Gefühlssinn, and stresses the inappropriateness of the term Tastsinn for touch 
(Chrétien 2004, p. 104). 
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both thinkers7. For Watsuji, the main problem in philosophy is related to the question of 
personhood (ningen) and betweenness (or, relatedness; aidagara) – as our social self. For 
him the substance is multiple, not solitary. Influenced by Heidegger, Watsuji’s 
philosophy aims at addressing the neglected problem of spatiality (as we know, 
temporality was in the forefront of Heidegger’s analyses). As Odin (1992, p. 479) states, 
“the notion of self as a substance with a fixed essence is abandoned for a relationally 
defined self which is fluid, shifting, open, decentred, multiple, and social in nature.” 
Since Watsuji’s philosophy is closely linked to Japanese aesthetics, it is of no coincidence 
of course that there is a close analogy between the constellations of Zeami’s Kakyō on 
the one hand and Watsuji’s on the other. Watsuji (as a Confucian and a Buddhist) has 
devoted his entire thought to the communitarian problem in ethics: being-with-others in 
community is now the basic mode of our self-constitution. In his analysis, Odin shows 
this in a convincing manner, also by addressing all of the most important elements of 
Mead’s philosophy8. It is also important to acknowledge – as Odin (1992, pp. 490f.) 
presents to us in his paper – various essays and analyses on the topic of Buddhist 
emptiness (śūnyatā) and the interrelated existence as an organismic process in Whitehead 
and American pragmatism. 
But to be able to go one step further and prepare the ground for an analysis of 
Feuerbach, Chrétien and Watsuji with Mead, I would like to take a closer look at 
Watsuji’s work Climate (Fūdo), which gathers all of the most important themes of his 
philosophy and relates them to a unique cosmological constellation, which is 
nevertheless similar to our pragmatist process-oriented thinking in Whitehead, Dewey or 
Mead. For Watsuji, climate “includes both society and living nature,” (p. 495) and 
aidagara as an interval (and the main “function” of climate) is structured on the basis of 
the Buddhist ontological mode of emptiness – which thus “empties” our self and 
establishes a new space of interrelatedness or betweenness of persons. Some critics saw 
this as a weakness of Watsuji’s theory, possibly leading to fascism or strong 
communitarianism as compared to Mead and his model, based on communicative or 
symbolic interaction. But in a more positive reading, the climate as an interspace can be 
of great value for our intersubjective relations. It can become the matrix of a new ethics, 
based on touch, sympathy and humility. Norman Wirzba (2010) addresses humility as a 
key consequence of Chrétien’s philosophy of touch: we have to empty ourselves of our 
egotistic nature of the mode I am and there is no one besides me, and enter the ethical 
relations with other based on humility, and thus reciprocity and responsiveness: “I feel 
myself only by the favor of the other” (Wirzba 2010, p. 235) and, even more 
importantly, “We need the space between self and other, so that we can learn to act on 
another’s behalf” (ibidem, p. 247). This space is the climate of our intersubjective relations, 
based on contact experience and touch. For Watsuji (1992, pp. 12-20), climate is what 
constitutes and underpins our self-understanding. We can never begin with a Cartesian 
or even Kantian gesture since we are always situated in an interspace – i.e. climate. Here 
we must return to Feuerbach: his philosophy of the elements as natural habitats of our 
                                                 
7 In this chapter, I will also refer to Watsuji Tetsuro’s Fūdo – Wind und Erde (1992). 
8 It can, of course, be of no coincidence that Mead’s closest pragmatist colleague, John Dewey, was 
entitled by Chinese philosophers upon his lecturing in China as “Second Confucius.” On this, see Hall 
and Ames (1999); see also J. Grange (2004), J. Dewey (1973) and J. Ching-Sze Wang (2007). 
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body-self (especially water and air) and also the related Aristotle’s echo in Chrétien – as an 
insistence on a medium (also consisting of water or air) between our “touch” and its 
“object” is now the main argument for a new understanding of an ethical constellation 
of gestures in Mead, as well. There is an analogy with our example from the Japanese 
Noh theatre – as in art and our conversational processes, so in atmospheric phenomena: 
according to Watsuji, we cannot feel the cold of the outer world or exist in it without 
always already being exposed. Analogically, we live in a social climate with its rituals. But 
the question still remains: which impulse in ourselves enables us to enter intersubjective 
relations, or, how is it possible to move our hand toward the other within the 
betweenness, time-space (aidagara, climate) of an ethical gesture? These are the questions 
that I wish to address in the final part of my essay. 
 
 
4. An Interval of Grace 
 
“For there to be gift event (we say event and not act), 
something must come about or happen, in an instant, in 
an instant that no doubt does not belong to the economy 
of time, in a time without time, in such a way that the 
forgetting forgets, that it forgets itself, but also in such a 
way that this forgetting without being something present, 
presentable, determinable, sensible, or meaningful, is not 
nothing” (Derrida 1992, p. 174). 
 
We have seen that in Chrétien’s phenomenology the basic intersubjective constellation 
(“I start by being ‘thou-ed’ by the world”) is accompanied by the notion of humility 
(emptying of our self), in a space that we both/all share. In the final part of my 
presentation I intend to argue that behind the scene, as it were, there appears a possibility in 
Mead for an inauguration of a space of interiority where our “social” time 
(communication as a mode of reciprocity or reflection of the reactions of others in me 
based on one-dimensional or successive time) similarly reverses into an ethical time – as 
an impossible time of grace as gift and hospitality. This grace, or this absolute and 
impossible gift, as Derrida (1992, p. 166) observes, “interrupts economy” and thus does 
not permit us to lean on any vulgar form of the economy of exchange and reciprocity. 
Economy is circular, says Derrida. Intersubjectivity based on economy and exchange is 
also circular. But the gift of ethical gesture in us is an interruption, an impossible act that 
inaugurates the time and space of interiority9. Only within the atmosphere of this 
interruption is an ethical act possible. 
Let me point out an interpretation of the problem of consciousness offered by 
American neurophysiologist Benjamin Libet (2004) in his famous work Mind Time. In 
this book, Libet convincingly argues that there is a 500 msec delay in our conscious 
sensory awareness between our subjective feeling and its unconscious beginning in the 
brain. This surprising observation of Libet’s bears important consequences on our 
                                                 
9 On this space and Kierkegaard as related to Mead, see my exploration in Breath of Proximity (ch. 4.5 on 
Mead). 
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knowledge of human agency, free will and the very logic of the awareness of our 
conscious (including ethical) acts. The very essence of his argument goes as follows:  
 
“If you tap your finger on a table, you experience the event as occurring in ‘real time.’ That is, you 
subjectively feel the touch occurring at the same time that your finger makes contact with the table. But 
our experimental evidence strongly supports a surprising finding that is directly counter to our own 
intuition and feelings: The brain needs a relatively long period of appropriate activations, up to about 
half a second, to elicit awareness of the event! Your conscious experience or awareness of your finger 
touching the table thus appears only after the brain activities have become adequate to produce the 
awareness” (Libet 2004, p. 33). 
 
According to Libet, we are therefore always a bit late in our conscious activities or 
responses. There is a gap (an interval) between reported and real time. This causes the 
fundamental problem of defining “the present moment” in ourselves: it seems that “the 
experience is actually one of an event 0.5 sec in the past” (ibidem, p. 88)10. In my opinion, 
this scientific evidence of Libet’s also supports an ethical intervention at the very core of 
various theories related to Mead’s symbolic interactionism.  
Let me return to my introductory example: we have seen that in Schopenhauer there 
is a gap between our conscious (in ethical terms egoistic) act, which follows my will (and 
is, in turn, part of the metaphysical Will), and our pure altruistic action (like sympathy, 
compassion, agápe or caritas), which is based on the denial of the Will. This gap cannot be 
explained in logical terms, and is only possible when the very rational (volitional) logic is 
reverted: in order to be able to act ethically, we have to deny our will. It is precisely in 
this act of the denial of the Will that Schopenhauer (1969, p. 404) discloses freedom qua 
grace (and quotes Malebranche: “la liberté est un mystère”)11. Interestingly enough, like 
Schopenhauer, Libet, too, has been charged with the original sin of annihilating free will 
in humans. But these charges are based on a vulgar understanding of free will. Both 
Schopenhauer and Libet share one extremely important insight: that we act before we 
have consciously decided to act. Translated into ethics of intersubjectivity, and in 
relation to our constellation above (with Feuerbach, Chrétien and Watsuji as three peaks 
in our new interpretative space), this means that there is a shared ethical space in our 
interiority or within our ethical core that we can call the climate or atmosphere of ethics. 
Beyond the more common inside-outside divide where dualistic logic leads us towards old 
dualisms, we rather seek for a processual ethics of reciprocity (call, response, 
anticipation, common climate), but with one important feature: that ultimately, our 
ethical act and our touching of the other (with the touch/direct/contact experience 
understood more broadly and not merely in the sense of “tact” and tactile experience) is 
always already situated within an ethical interval or gap in a time-space.  
                                                 
10 Note also this example, which is already more closely related to the problem of ethics: “You are 
driving along in your car at 30 mph on a city street. Suddenly, a young boy steps into the street in front 
of your car, chasing a ball. You slam your foot on the brake pedal to bring the car to a screeching halt. 
Were you consciously aware of the event before stepping on the brake? Or was that an unconscious 
action that you became aware of after you hit the brakes?” (Libet 2004, p. 90). 
11 “For just what the Christian mystics call the effect of grace and the new birth, is for us the only direct 
expression of the freedom of the will.” 
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Let us remind ourselves once more of our example from Kakyō: I think Mead is 
actually very close to this constellation: our act is always attuned to the very response of 
the other. Mead does not use words such as the ch’i of the audience (society), but from 
his thought it is evident that he knows perfectly well we have to secure our inner space 
or interiority (embodied mind, embodied cognition) to be able to enter, as it were, the 
stage of epistemology or ethics. Upon discussing sympathy, in his 1914 class lectures, 
Mead gives an interesting passage:  
 
“The idea of looking into the eyes of one who is suffering involves an inner idea. […] The other is a 
different person and, being different, his suffering is different from mine, but he is a suffering being to 
whom I react immediately. Other individuals exist for us as having inner ideas, which in a certain sense 
we can never penetrate. […] It is because the material is the same that other persons have an inner idea 
of us. […] The child is conscious of the hard floor long before he is aware of the introdermal self that 
is injured by the hard floor” (Miller 1982, p. 62). 
 
I will end my interpretation here. In this synchronistic reading of Mead’s philosophy I 
wanted to explore the possibility of another time-space in ethics, one closely related to 
Mead’s fundamental insights, but still situated within the excess, surplus, gap, or interval 
which cannot simply be explained by ordinary epistemological tools that Mead had been 
using in his works. There is a further need to explore this secret and paradoxical time-
space of ethics, and today I have only taken the first step in that direction. We can never 
become other persons and this fact secures their and our autonomy and freedom. There 
always exists an interval between us, one that Aristotle mentioned in his On the Soul. But 
there is another gap or interval, one that cannot be observed epistemologically since it 
evades its very logic: it is best visible in a caress, and the behind the scene logic, as it were. 
Like the actor from Kakyō, who must know, even before coming on stage, what he is to 
expect from the audience, we too, precognitively know well before his appearance how 
we would act. But the mystery of all ethics that I wanted to point to with this essay, lies 
precisely in this infinitely short moment before our ethical act. Finally, I will call this 
moment an interval of grace. 
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